Michigan Proposal 2026-1: the constitutional convention question

1The exhibits

Both claims are stated in their common form. Each circulates in many wordings, in campaign material, in commentary, and in conversation, and each is rephrased here accurately and in the same way, so that no one person's exact words are singled out. The first claim holds that the 1963 Constitution is more than sixty years old, that it has been patched one amendment at a time until it no longer fits how Michigan is governed, and that only a convention can take up the whole document at once and fix what the piecemeal process cannot. The second claim holds that a convention puts everything in the constitution up for renegotiation at the same time, including rights and protections voters adopted on purpose, with no deadline on its work and a large, open ended cost that the state pays whether or not the voters accept the result. The record underneath both claims is in section 3.

2What is being decided

The instrument's operative text, as it will appear on the ballot (reproduced in the exhibit from the House Fiscal Agency under the statement that it is the official language, and reproduced word for word by the Senate Fiscal Agency):

Proposal 2026-1 A proposal to convene a constitutional convention for the purpose of drafting a general revision of the State Constitution Shall a convention of elected delegates be convened in 2027 to draft a general revision of the State Constitution for presentation to the state's voters for their approval or rejection? [ ] YES [ ] NO

Its plain meaning: a yes vote changes no word of the constitution on election night. It calls an election of 148 delegates, one from each of the 110 House districts and each of the 38 Senate districts, and nothing those delegates propose takes effect unless a majority of all of them send it to the voters and a majority of the voters approve it. The question is decided by a majority of the electors voting on the question itself; a voter who skips the question counts neither way. The decision maker is the Michigan electorate. The decision date is November 3, 2026.

The status quo, stated as carefully as the change: the 1963 Constitution continues in force, as it has for 63 years, the longest of Michigan's four constitutions. Amendments can still be proposed by the legislature or by voter petition and decided one at a time, as every change since 1963 has been made. No delegates are elected and no convention costs are incurred, and the convention question returns on its own at the November 2042 general election.

3What this argument is really about

One premise under the first claim is that the document's problems are structural, spread across its articles, so that fixing them one amendment at a time cannot reach them. A second premise is that breadth is an opportunity: one elected body, able to weigh trade offs across the whole document at once, can produce a more coherent constitution than decades of separate single question votes. One premise under the second claim is that breadth is the risk itself: provisions adopted deliberately, one question at a time, can be reopened inside a single negotiation in which no single issue receives its own vote. A second premise is that an open ended agenda and an open ended cost are the same kind of problem, a commitment made before its terms are known. Neither premise is a figure. The figures are in section 3, and the disagreement they leave open is stated in section 8.

4The verified record

• The question itself: Proposal 2026-1 is on the November 3, 2026 ballot because the constitution requires the question of a general revision to be submitted in 1978 and in each sixteenth year after. No petition drive and no legislative vote placed it there this year. (Verified. Constitution of Michigan of 1963, Article XII, Section 3; House Fiscal Agency.)
• The official language, as it will appear on the ballot (reproduced by the House Fiscal Agency under the statement that it is the official language, and reproduced word for word by the Senate Fiscal Agency):

Proposal 2026-1 A proposal to convene a constitutional convention for the purpose of drafting a general revision of the State Constitution Shall a convention of elected delegates be convened in 2027 to draft a general revision of the State Constitution for presentation to the state's voters for their approval or rejection? [ ] YES [ ] NO

• How the question is decided: by a majority of the electors voting on the question itself. A voter who skips the question counts neither way. Before a 1960 amendment, the call required a majority of everyone voting in the election, and in 1942, 1948, and 1958 a majority of those voting on the question said yes and the call still failed. (Verified. Article XII, Section 3; Citizens Research Council, Special Report 425-02.)
• The delegates: one delegate elected from each representative district (110) and one from each senatorial district (38), 148 in total, at a partisan election. In 1961 there were 144, because there were then 34 Senate districts. (Verified. Article XII, Section 3; House Fiscal Agency; Senate Fiscal Agency.)
• The deadline, and the law that does not exist yet: if the call is approved, the delegate election must be held not later than six months after the proposal is certified as approved. The canvass of the 2026 general election is set for November 23, 2026, which places the deadline at about May 22, 2027. No statute now in place fully implements this section, so the legislature must first enact laws covering the delegate elections and the convention's funding. The delegate election schedules described in the process literature differ from one another and cannot be settled until the legislature acts, so this brief files the constitutional deadline and no specific election dates. (Verified. Article XII, Section 3; House Fiscal Agency.)
• Convening: the delegates convene at the seat of government in Lansing on the first Tuesday in October after their election, which in 2027 is October 5, or earlier if provided by law. (Verified. Article XII, Section 3; House Fiscal Agency; Senate Fiscal Agency; Citizens Research Council, Special Report 425-01.)
• How the convention runs itself: it chooses its own officers, determines the rules of its proceedings, and judges the qualifications, elections, and returns of its own members. It may appoint the officers, employees, and assistants it deems necessary and fix their compensation. Each delegate receives the compensation provided by law. To fill a vacancy, the governor appoints a qualified resident of the same district who is a member of the same party as the delegate who left. Its budget is subject to legislative appropriation. (Verified. Article XII, Section 3; Senate Fiscal Agency.)
• Length: neither the constitution nor any statute sets a time limit on the convention's work. The 1961-62 convention sat about ten months, from October 3, 1961 to August 1, 1962. (Verified. House Fiscal Agency; Citizens Research Council, Special Report 425-16.)
• Scope: the constitution is silent on what subjects a convention may take up. On the Citizens Research Council's reading, a convention elected by the people is free to fashion any kind of document it pleases, subject to the restraints of the United States Constitution and to having its product ratified by the state's voters. A convention could propose an entirely new document, a handful of amendments, a cleanup of obsolete provisions, or no change at all. (Verified. Citizens Research Council, Special Report 425-01; House Fiscal Agency.)
• The two locks before anything takes effect: a proposed constitution or amendment can be sent to the voters only with the assent of a majority of all the delegates elected and serving, 75 of 148, with the names and votes of those voting entered in the journal. It is then submitted to the voters at a time the convention provides, not less than 90 days after the convention's final adjournment, and it takes effect only if a majority of the qualified electors voting on it approve. A convention, by itself, cannot change one word of the constitution. (Verified. Article XII, Section 3; House Fiscal Agency.)
• The cost, House Fiscal Agency: the agency's headline estimate is a total state cost of approximately $78.3 million, and it states that the figure assumes the current delegate compensation caps are adjusted for inflation. The convention itself, modeled on 1961-62 at the same roughly ten month length with inflation adjusted delegate pay, comes to about $22.3 million, of which about $12.0 million is delegate salaries and about $10.3 million is staff and other costs. Under Public Act 204 of 1958, which is still in force, delegate pay is capped at $1,000 per month and $7,500 in total per delegate; at those caps, total delegate salaries would come to about $1.1 million. The 1958 caps equal about $11,166 per month and an $83,745 maximum in current dollars. The agency prices one standalone statewide election at about $28.0 million in local reimbursements, based on the 2024 presidential primary, and its headline counts two elections as incurring added cost, about $56.0 million, judging it likely that at least one required election coincides with an election already scheduled. (Verified as the agency's stated estimates and assumptions. House Fiscal Agency, analysis complete to October 7, 2026.)
• The cost, Senate Fiscal Agency: by its first method, the 1961 costs inflated with delegate pay held at the 1958 statutory caps, the convention would cost about $10.2 million in 2027 dollars, about $0.85 million per month. By its second method, scaling the Michigan Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission's net operating spending, about $1.9 million per year for a body of 13, by a factor of 11 for a body of 148, about $22.0 million per year, about $1.8 million per month. By its third method, the Oklahoma Legislature's fiscal year 2025-26 operating budget as a proxy for a similarly sized part time body, about $47.3 million per year, about $3.9 million per month. For elections, the agency prices a standalone statewide election at about $20.3 million, finds that three unscheduled elections could exceed $60.9 million in added cost, and finds that the added cost could be zero if the elections are held on regularly scheduled dates. The agency's governing caveat is that the convention's budget is whatever the legislature appropriates, so its figures are analogies, not a quoted price. (Verified as the agency's stated estimates and methods. Senate Fiscal Agency.)
• The cost, what the two records show together: there is no single official estimate. The two nonpartisan fiscal agencies used different methods and reached materially different totals. Both treat the convention's length as the largest variable, because no deadline limits it, and both identify the delegate pay level and the scheduling of the required elections as the next largest. Any single figure quoted in the argument comes from one method, with its assumptions attached, and the assumptions are where the agencies differ. (Corroborated. House Fiscal Agency; Senate Fiscal Agency.)
• The four constitutions: Michigan has had four. The 1835 constitution was in force 15 years. The 1850 constitution was in force 58 years; it created the automatic convention question and required a majority of everyone voting in the election to call one. The 1908 constitution was in force 55 years. The 1963 constitution has been in force 63 years as of this election, the longest of the four. (Verified. Citizens Research Council, Special Report 425-02; Senate Fiscal Agency.)
• The road to the current constitution: in November 1960, voters approved a citizen initiated amendment by 1,312,215 to 959,527, 58 percent, changing the counting rule to a majority of those voting on the question and setting a call vote for the spring of 1961. The call passed in April 1961 by 23,421 votes, 596,433 to 573,012. The 144 delegates were elected in September 1961, the convention sat from October 3, 1961 to August 1, 1962, and the voters ratified the new constitution on April 1, 1963 by 810,860 to 803,436, a margin of 7,424 votes. It took effect on January 1, 1964. (Verified. Citizens Research Council, Special Report 425-02; Michigan Constitutional Archive; House Fiscal Agency.)
• Split decisions in Michigan's own record: in 1866 the voters approved a convention call, and in 1868 they rejected the convention's proposed constitution, 71,733 for and 110,582 against. A governor appointed commission's revision was rejected in 1874 by about three to one. A yes on the call and a yes on the product are separate decisions, and Michigan has made them separately before. (Verified. Citizens Research Council, Special Report 425-02.)
• The answers under the automatic schedule: in 1978, 640,286 voted for a convention (23 percent) and 2,112,549 against. In 1994, 777,779 voted for (28 percent) and 2,008,070 against. In 2010, 983,019 voted for (33 percent) and 1,960,573 against. The share voting in favor has risen at each asking while remaining roughly two to one against or worse. (Verified. Michigan Department of State figures as tabulated by the Citizens Research Council, Special Report 425-01.)
• Amendments since 1963 (Disputed): the Citizens Research Council counts 98 amendments proposed by the legislature and by voter circulated petitions since 1963, of which 44 were adopted. The House Fiscal Agency counts 82 attempts and 39 approved. The two counts use different inclusion rules, and neither source reconciles the other in the material behind this brief, so both counts are printed here and neither total is relied on anywhere else in this brief. (Disputed. Citizens Research Council, Special Report 425-16; House Fiscal Agency.)
• Other states: in every mandatory periodic convention referendum held so far this century, in the fourteen states that ask on a cycle, the voters have rejected calling a convention. The last voter approved call anywhere was Rhode Island in 1984, and the convention that followed produced the constitution Rhode Island adopted in 1986. The most recent large state asking, New York in 2017, rejected the call by 83.2 percent to 16.8 percent. Across recent referendums, the average vote in favor is about 36 percent. (Corroborated. Florida Law Review survey of state constitutional conventions; State Politics and Policy Quarterly supplement; New York State Constitutional Convention Clearinghouse.)
• The neutral review of the document: the Citizens Research Council published a sixteen paper series in 2026 reviewing every article of the 1963 Constitution and states that it takes no position on calling a convention. Its findings include articles and sections that have withstood the test of time and appear to be working as intended, provisions under sustained scrutiny that a convention would likely take up, and provisions that are obsolete or inoperative because they conflict with the United States Constitution, among them the inoperative ban on same sex marriage, which only a revision or an amendment can remove from the text. Its catalog of provisions most likely to be contested at a convention includes reproductive rights, voting rights and election rules, legislative and executive term limits, the election of judges, local government home rule, tax and revenue limitations, the ban on public dollars for private schools, public pension protections, and the amendment process itself. (Verified. Citizens Research Council, Special Reports 425-01 and 425-16 and the series index.)

5Where exhibit 1 holds, and where it breaks

The first claim holds on the document's age and on the way it has been changed. The 1963 Constitution has been in force for 63 years, longer than any Michigan constitution before it, and every change in that time has come one amendment at a time, proposed by the legislature or by voter petition and decided on its own. It holds on the dead language in the text: the Citizens Research Council's article by article review identifies provisions that are obsolete or inoperative under the United States Constitution, and they remain printed in the document until a revision or an amendment removes them. It holds on the structural point at its center, because a general revision, the whole document taken up at once, is something only a convention can attempt. The claim breaks where it treats the piecemeal record as a record of failure to change. The amendment route has changed the constitution repeatedly across six decades; the two counts of that record disagree with each other (section 3), and neither describes a process that cannot move. It also breaks where it states, as settled, that the document no longer fits how the state is governed. The neutral review in the record returns a mixed finding, some articles working as intended and others under sustained scrutiny, and the claim presents one half of that finding as the whole of it. What a convention would produce in place of the current document cannot be checked against the claim at all, because the delegates are not yet elected and no product exists.

6Where exhibit 2 holds, and where it breaks

The second claim holds on scope. The constitution places no subject off limits to a convention, and provisions that voters adopted one at a time, among them reproductive rights, pension protections, voting rules, and tax limits, could all be taken up in the same room and in the same negotiation. It holds on time: no deadline in the constitution or in any statute limits how long the convention may sit. It holds on money in one specific way: the costs in section 3 are incurred through the process itself, and they are spent whether or not the voters later adopt the product, as the record of 1866 and 1868 shows in Michigan's own history. The claim breaks where it can be heard to say that a convention could change the constitution. A convention cannot change one word on its own. A proposal leaves the convention only with the assent of a majority of all 148 delegates, with each vote recorded by name in the journal, and it takes effect only if a majority of the voters approve it at an election held no less than 90 days after the convention adjourns. The convention could also propose a narrow cleanup of obsolete provisions, or no change at all; reopening a contested provision is within its power, and so is leaving every one of them alone. The claim also presents the cost without the bounds the record names. The total is set by legislative appropriation. Delegate pay currently sits under caps written in 1958 unless the legislature raises them, and on the Senate Fiscal Agency's analysis the added election cost could be zero if the required elections fall on dates already scheduled. The range in the record is wide, and it is wide for stated reasons, which is a different thing from a cost with no terms at all.

7What is true in both

Both claims stand on the same ground. The document is 63 years old, and it has been amended many times. A convention's scope is genuinely unlimited within federal limits, and its product genuinely cannot take effect without a second majority vote of the people. The delegates would be elected district by district, and the final decision on anything they propose would belong to the voters. The disagreement between the claims is not over any of those facts. It is over the single fact both of them cite, the breadth of a convention, read in one claim as the opportunity and in the other as the risk.

8The number in the middle

148. Michigan would elect one delegate from each of its 110 House districts and each of its 38 Senate districts. In 1961 the same formula produced 144 delegates, because there were then 34 Senate districts. The number turns an abstract question into a specific body of people, chosen by the voters of each district in an election held within six months of certification. It also carries the convention's internal threshold with it: nothing leaves the convention for the voters unless at least 75 of the 148 assent to it.

9Projections and analogues

Filed projections, taken from the exhibit's annex in substance, with dual confidence labels intact.

Projection MC-0009-P1. If the call is approved, the fixed sequence runs and the convention convenes on October 5, 2027.

• Outcome: the elected delegates convene at the seat of government in Lansing on October 5, 2027, a datable event.
• Horizon: October 5, 2027.
• Mechanism: certification of the November 3, 2026 vote, with the canvass set for November 23, 2026, opens a six month window. Inside that window the legislature enacts the implementing laws and the voters elect the delegates. The delegates then convene on the first Tuesday of the following October. The window and the convening date are links fixed by the constitutional text. The implementing legislation link depends on the legislature acting in time, and it is marked as an implementation link.
• Assumptions: (1) certification proceeds on the canvass schedule; (2) the legislature enacts the implementing laws in time for a delegate election inside the six month window; (3) no law sets an earlier convening date, which the constitution permits.
• Supporting record: the Article XII, Section 3 sequence, the certification date, and the convening rule (Verified). Michigan's 1961-62 sequence ran on the same structure under the previous call (Verified, Citizens Research Council, Special Report 425-02).
• Analogues: Michigan 1961-62, the same mechanism in the same state (Strong). No out of state analogue is needed for a sequence fixed by the text.
• Evidence confidence: Verified.
• Projection confidence: High.
• What would change this: implementing legislation setting an earlier convening date would move the date earlier, as the constitution allows. A failure to enact implementing laws inside the window would contradict the constitutional deadline in public and would retire this projection for a refiled one on the enacted facts.
• Review date: the Morning After audit following October 5, 2027.

Projection MC-0009-P2. If the call is approved, the total state cost lands inside the fiscal agencies' spread.

• Outcome: the total state cost of the delegate elections, the convention, and the ratification election, measured in dollars appropriated and spent, lands between the low tens of millions and about $78.3 million, and exceeds that range if the convention sits substantially longer than the 1961-62 convention's ten months with delegate pay set at inflation adjusted levels.
• Horizon: checkable when the convention has adjourned and the ratification election has been held. On the earliest path consistent with the record, no earlier than late 2028.
• Mechanism: the legislature appropriates the convention's budget and reimburses election costs, so the total is produced by three things in sequence: the delegate pay level the legislature sets, the number of required elections that fall on otherwise empty dates, and the convention's length, which no rule limits. The pay and scheduling links are decisions not yet made, and the length link is a decision the convention itself would make. All three are marked as implementation links.
• Assumptions: (1) the convention sits for roughly a year, on the 1961-62 pattern; (2) delegate pay is set somewhere between the 1958 statutory caps and their inflation adjusted level; (3) at least one required election coincides with an election already scheduled.
• Supporting record: the House Fiscal Agency's total estimate of about $78.3 million on its stated assumptions (Verified as the agency's stated estimate). The Senate Fiscal Agency's methods, producing about $10.2 million for the convention at capped pay and about $47.3 million per year on its legislature proxy (Verified as the agency's stated estimates). Both agencies naming the convention's length as the largest variable (Corroborated).
• Analogues: the 1961-62 Michigan convention's duration, used by both agencies as the length pattern (Usable). The Senate agency's two further analogues, the redistricting commission and the Oklahoma Legislature, are recorded in the exhibit's Verified Record with their figures and methods.
• Evidence confidence: Verified. The supporting figures are the two nonpartisan agencies' stated estimates, each printed with its method.
• Projection confidence: Low. The two largest inputs, the convention's length and the legislature's delegate pay decision, cannot be observed before the horizon.
• What would change this: the appropriation bills, once filed, replace the analogies with enacted figures. At that point this projection can be raised in confidence or retired in favor of a refiled projection on the enacted numbers.
• Review date: the Morning After audit following the ratification election.

Projection MC-0009-P3. If the call is rejected, constitutional change continues through the amendment process.

• Outcome: amendments continue to be proposed by the legislature and by voter petition and decided one at a time in the years after the vote, measurable in the proposals placed before voters at later general elections.
• Horizon: first checkable at the Morning After audit following the November 2028 general election, and carried to later audits for the pattern.
• Mechanism: a no vote changes nothing in the amendment machinery, which sits in the same constitution and has operated continuously since 1963. No behavioral link is required for the route to remain available. The volume of its use depends on future legislatures and petitioners, and that link is marked as a behavioral link.
• Assumptions: (1) no later amendment removes the amendment routes themselves; (2) legislatures and petitioners continue to use the routes at something like the historical rate.
• Supporting record: continuous amendment activity followed each of the 1978, 1994, and 2010 rejections, and across the life of the document (Corroborated). The amendment totals themselves are Disputed between the Citizens Research Council and the House Fiscal Agency in the exhibit; the dispute affects the totals, not the existence of the pattern this projection rests on.
• Analogues: Michigan's own three prior cycles under this constitution, after the 1978, 1994, and 2010 rejections (Strong, for the continuation pattern).
• Evidence confidence: Corroborated.
• Projection confidence: Moderate.
• What would change this: a sustained absence of amendment proposals across two consecutive general election cycles would retire this projection as not supported at its audit.
• Review date: the Morning After audit following the November 2028 general election.

A projection not filed, and why (carried from the exhibit's annex). No projection is filed on the fate of any convention product. Michigan's record contains a convention product rejected outright (1868) and a convention product ratified by half of one percent (1963), and the document a 2027 convention would write does not exist. The record supports no projection in either direction, so none is printed.

10Debatable / not debatable

The factual part is settled by the documents cited above: the question appears automatically every sixteen years because the constitutional text places it there; only the votes on the question itself are counted; a yes vote starts a process and changes nothing by itself; the convention would seat 148 delegates and convene on October 5, 2027; its product requires a majority of all delegates and then a majority of the voters; and if the question fails it returns in 2042. Those items are not debatable, because each is fixed by the text of Article XII, Section 3, by the arithmetic of the districts, or by a certified historical result. What the record cannot settle is whether the document's problems are structural or can be repaired one amendment at a time, whether the unlimited scope of a convention is an opportunity or a risk, and whether a cost somewhere inside the fiscal agencies' range is a fair price for a process whose product the voters may reject. Those items are debatable, because each asks what should be done, which value matters more, or how a trade off should be weighed. One further item belongs in the same place: what a convention would do with the contested provisions in the record, among them reproductive rights, tax limitations, pension protections, and term limits. That is debatable in a stricter sense. The delegates are not yet elected, and any statement about the product is a prediction, not a finding. The record contains none that can be verified, and this brief files none.

11What we simplified

This brief presents the cost record as each fiscal agency's headline figures and stated assumptions; the agencies' full models are filed in the Receipt Pack, and no single total is presented as settled, because the two agencies' methods do not produce one.

12Words in this brief

General revision

a rewriting of the constitution as a whole, taken up in one process. Commonly misused as: any large change, including a package of separate amendments voted on one at a time. Only a convention can attempt a general revision.

Amendment

a single change to the constitution, proposed by the legislature or by voter petition and decided on its own. Commonly misused as: the same thing as a general revision. The amendment route changes one provision at a time; it cannot take up the whole document at once.

Delegate

a person elected from one House or Senate district to sit in the convention. Commonly misused as: a legislator, or an appointed official. Delegates are elected for this single task, at a partisan election.

Ratification

the voters' later vote on a convention's product, which must pass before any part of that product takes effect. Commonly misused as: a formality that follows automatically once a convention finishes. Michigan voters rejected a convention's proposed constitution in 1868.

Implementing law

a statute the legislature must pass to run the delegate elections and fund the convention, because no complete one is in place now. Commonly misused as: already on the books. Until it is enacted, the schedules for the delegate elections cannot be settled, and only the constitutional deadline can be stated.

13Sources

Primary first. All accessed October 30, 2026. 1. Constitution of Michigan of 1963, Article XII, Section 3, full text with history, Michigan Constitutional Archive (text sourced to the Legislative Service Bureau printing of the ratified constitution). https://www.mackinac.org/constitution/1963/xii-3 2. Michigan House Fiscal Agency, "Ballot Proposal 1 of 2026: State Constitutional Convention" (analysis complete to October 7, 2026). https://house.mi.gov/HFA/PDF/Alpha/Ballot_Proposal_1_of_2026.pdf 3. Michigan Senate Fiscal Agency, "November 2026 Ballot Proposal 26-1: An Overview." https://sfa.senate.michigan.gov/Publications/BallotProps/Proposal26-1.pdf 4. Citizens Research Council of Michigan, "General Revision of the Michigan Constitution," Special Report 425-01, February 2026. https://crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2020s/2026/rpt42501-general-revision-michigan-constitution.pdf 5. Citizens Research Council of Michigan, "A Brief Michigan Constitutional History," Special Report 425-02, February 2026. https://crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2020s/2026/rpt42502-a-brief-michigan-constitutional-history.pdf 6. Citizens Research Council of Michigan, "Proposal 2026-01: Constitutional Revision," Special Report 425-16, September 2026. https://www.tuscolacounty.org/clerk/doc/2026-election/Proposal%202026-1%20Summary%20Review%20by%20Citizens%20Research%20Council.pdf 7. Citizens Research Council of Michigan, "Michigan Constitutional Issues" series index (16 papers, February to September 2026). https://crcmich.org/publications/2026con-con-2 8. Michigan State University Extension, "What's on the Ballot? Understanding Michigan's 2026 Ballot Proposals," October 14, 2026 (cited as co-sponsor of the public education series; no separate Extension analysis of this proposal was found). https://msu-prod.dotcmscloud.com/events/what-s-on-the-ballot-understanding-michigan-s-2026-ballot-proposals 9. Analogue sources, marked as such: "Constitutional Conventions: Insights from America's State Constitutional Tradition," Florida Law Review. https://www.floridalawreview.com/article/145829.pdf · State Politics and Policy Quarterly, supplement Table 1, "Recent Constitutional Convention Referendum Votes." https://sagejournals.cnpereading.com/storage/sage/journal/article/SLG/2019/SLG_2019_51_1/unzip/ds-slg-10.1177_0160323X19858396/Conventional_Wisdom_SLGR_Table_and_figure_supplement.pdf · New York State Constitutional Convention Clearinghouse, "Post-Mortem: New York's Nov. 7, 2017 Referendum." https://newyork.concon.info/?p=3201

14Filed updates

No filed updates. (The exhibit's filed updates line reads: Last validated October 30, 2026. Filed updates: 0. Latest: none filed.)